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Home » Social Sciences » Economics » Game Theory (Yale) » 15. Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats (Yale)

15. Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats (Yale)

Course:Game Theory (Yale)
Discipline:Social Sciences
Institute:Yale University
Instructor(s): Professor Ben Polak
Level:College

Game Theory (Yale)

10. Mixed strategies in baseball, dating and paying your taxes (Yale)
1. Introduction: five first lessons (Yale)
11. Evolutionary stability: cooperation, mutation, and equilibrium (Yale)
12. Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles (Yale)
13. Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions (Yale)
14. Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover advantages (Yale)
15. Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats (Yale)
16. Backward induction: reputation and duels (Yale)
17. Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining (Yale)
18. Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection (Yale)
19. Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments (Yale)
2. Putting yourselves into other people's shoes (Yale)
20. Subgame perfect equilibrium: wars of attrition (Yale)
21. Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game (Yale)
22. Repeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing (Yale)
23. Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education (Yale)
24. Asymmetric information: auctions and the winner's curse (Yale)
3. Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem (Yale)
4. Best responses in soccer and business partnerships (Yale)
5. Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bank runs (Yale)

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